Throughout 2019, import constraints on fuel and particularly diesel have been manipulated by the coalition by restricting imports, by senior internationally recognised government (IRG) officials obtaining contracts at inflated prices without open bidding, and by the Huthis who control the distribution of the limited supplies thus allowing the black market to flourish, a black market which is, of course, run by their allies. All that has been at the expense of the population at large throughout the country who need fuel to pump water for domestic purposes, for the operation of generators and for transport, and thus suffer both shortages and increased cost which they can’t afford.
Financial issues are at the heart of the struggle between the Huthi movement and the IRG and a major element of the war. The transfer of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) to Aden in 2016 has slowed remittance flows, almost stopped payment of salaries, caused the currency to collapse, and worsened inflation.
The list of problems is long. All these actions have contributed significantly to increased poverty but have also allowed senior central bank and other officials to make millions from manipulating exchange rates and operating black markets. The transfer of the CBY resulted in the existence of two rival central banks vying to control the currency and trade. This has reduced commercial imports through their competitive and incompatible administrative requirements from importers, thus limiting the number of traders who have access to the letters of credit essential for the import of fuel and basic food supplies. This has favoured those with good relations with the officials in charge, some of whom have not missed the opportunity for enrichment.
One example among many: after months of negotiations, the factions agreed to put Hodeida fuel revenues in a special account in the Hodeida branch of the Central Bank and use these funds to pay long delayed salaries to civil servants in the Huthi controlled part of the country. By January 2020, this account contained USD 80 million but nothing had been disbursed, as the two sides argued over the list of beneficiaries.
Since December, people have to deal with the additional problems arising from what are now effectively two sets of currencies circulating, as the Huthis have banned the use of new bank notes printed by the internationally recognised government; this is preventing people from accessing salaries and pensions which should reach them from the IRG across the dividing lines. It also prevents routine exchanges within families and with local shopkeepers. People in Huthi controlled areas who have such notes must exchange them for old notes, paper or electronic vouchers or a new ‘e-currency’. Given previous history and the fact that Yemen is still a country where cash is the main payment mechanism, no one trusts this system. The increasing shortage of old bank notes in this part of the country, is yet another problem for daily life.
Humanitarian issues
This week, according to international media, humanitarian efforts have achieved a major success: seven extremely seriously ill women and children were flown out of Sana’a airport for treatment abroad; they are to be followed by another 23. It only took two years since the coalition first announced that such flights would be allowed out of Sana’a airport, which has been closed for more than 3 years. The Ministry of Health estimates that more than 32 000 patients have died in the past two years because they could not be flown out for urgent treatment.
As neatly put by the Norwegian Refugee Council Director “today’s move comes too late for thousands of Yemenis who died waiting to leave the country for urgent life-saving care. They were handed a death sentence when the Saudi-led coalition blockaded northern Yemen by closing down the airport in Sana’a over three years ago…There is no justification for punishing very sick civilians by blocking them from accessing medical treatment.” The fact that such a minor action can be described as a major success only demonstrates, yet again, the contempt of decision makers on all sides for the suffering of Yemenis.
Despite the publicity surrounding the very high levels of humanitarian aid and the millions of beneficiaries, significant amounts are diverted by the authorities or distributed on a nepotistic basis rather than objective criteria of need. Access to humanitarian assistance has become increasingly important throughout Yemen, despite the fact that the majority of food and other basic imports are done through commercial channels. In December 2019, the World Food Programme (WFP) assisted close to 13 million people; although this figure is vast, it represents only three quarters of those it recognises as needing food aid and about 60% of those the UN describes as needing humanitarian assistance of one kind or another.
The UN usually publishes annually its Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and a needs assessment, towards the end of the year. This includes details of its intended programme and is followed by a pledging conference in Geneva around mid-February. Interestingly, unlike previous years, by early February, the UN has not produced any public information about its plan for the year beyond a terse announcement that it will be about USD 3 billion, ie 25% less than in 2019 and reach fewer people, though there is little suggestion that the need was reduced.
Print
Helen Lackner | Radio Free (2020-02-06T23:00:00+00:00) Yemen’s hopes and expectations – Part 3: living conditions and humanitarian aid. Retrieved from https://www.radiofree.org/2020/02/06/yemens-hopes-and-expectations-part-3-living-conditions-and-humanitarian-aid/
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